Abstract. In this paper we study the security of hash functions SM3 and BLAKE-256 against boomerang attack. SM3 for BLAKE-256. Especially, since our distinguishers on 34/35-step compression function of SM3 and 7-round keyed permutation of BLAKE-256 are practical, we are able to obtain boomerang quartets of these attacks. As far as we know, these are the best results against round-reduced SM3 and BLAKE-256.
final BLAKE-256 with 14 rounds proposed in 2010). Then L. Wang et al. [21] announced 4/4.5-round free-start preimage attacks on compression function of BLAKE-32. J.-P. Aumasson et al. [22] gave near collisions on 4-round compression function and impossible differential for 5-round keyed permutation of BLAKE-32. Then B. Su et al. [23] proposed near collision attack on 4-round compression function of BLAKE-32 with lower complexity than [22] . At FSE 2011, A. Biryukov et al. [4] presented boomerang attacks on 7 round-reduced compression function and 8 round-reduced keyed permutation of BLAKE-32, and a boomerang quartet of distinguisher on 6 round-reduced keyed permutation was also given, however, there are some incompatible problems in [4] later pointed out by G. Leurent in [24] . In [25] O. Dunkelman and D. Khovratovich presented differential distinguisher for the keyed permutation of BLAKE-256 reduced to 6 middle rounds.
Our Contribution. In this work, we study the security of hash functions SM3 and BLAKE-256, and show the application of boomerang attack to round-reduced compression function of SM3 and keyed permutation of BLAKE-256. First, we build boomerang distinguishers for SM3 compression function on up to 34 and 35 steps with practical complexities, and examples of boomerang quartets are also given. Moreover, the distinguishers can be extended to attacks on 36 and 37 steps of SM3. Then we show some incompatible problems existed in the differential characteristics used in the previous work [17] . Furthermore, we present the first valid boomerang distinguishers on up to 7 and 8 round-reduced keyed permutation of BLAKE-256. We are able to find boomerang quartets of our distinguisher on 7 round-reduced keyed permutation of BLAKE-256, which are one more round than the previous practical example [4] .
Among all attacks, our analysis of SM3 and BLAKE-256 penetrates the most number of rounds. The summary of previous results and ours are given in Table 1 .
Outline. The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we give a short description of hash functions SM3 and BLAKE-256. Section 3 briefly overviews the boomerang attack. In Section 4, we present the differential characteristics and build boomerang distinguishers for step-reduced SM3 compression function. The boomerang distinguishers for roundreduced keyed permutation of BLAKE-256 are proposed in Section 5. Finally, we conclude our paper in Section 6.
Description of Hash Functions SM3 and BLAKE-256

SM3 Hash Function
SM3 is an iterated hash function that processes 512-bit input message blocks and produces a 256-bit hash value. It basically consists of two parts: the message expansion and the state update transformation. A detailed description of SM3 hash function is given in [13] . Message Expansion. The message expansion of SM3 splits the 512-bit message block into 16 words m i (0 ≤ i ≤ 15), and expands them into 68 expanded message words w i (0 ≤ i ≤ 67) and 64 expanded message words w i (0 ≤ i ≤ 63) as follows:
The function P 1 (X) is given by
State Update Transformation. The state update transformation starts from a (fixed) initial value IV = (A 0 , B 0 , C 0 , 
The step constants are T i = 0x79cc4519 for i ∈ {0, . . . , 15} and T i = 0x7a879d8a for i ∈ {16, . . . , 63}. The bitwise boolean functions F F (X, Y, Z) and GG(X, Y, Z) used in each step are defined as follows:
The linear function P 0 (X) is defined as follows:
After the last step of the state update transformation, the initial values are added to the output values of the last step.
The result is the final hash value or the initial value for the next message block.
BLAKE-256 Hash Function
The hash function BLAKE-256 operates on 32-bit words and returns a 32-byte hash value. Its compression function processes a state of 16 32-bit words represented as 4×4 matrix, and consists of three steps: Initialization, 14 iterations of Rounds and Finalization.
Initialization. In the Initialization procedure, the state is filled with a chaining value h = h 0 , . . . , h 7 , a salt s = s 0 , . . . , s 3 , constants c 0 , . . . , c 7 , and a counter t = t 0 , t 1 as follows:
Round function. Once the state v = (v 0 , . . . , v 15 ) is initialized, the compression function iterates a series of 14 rounds.
Each round is a transformation of the state v that computes
where G i (a, b, c, d) at round r is described with the following steps:
here σ r belongs to the set of permutations as defined in Table 2 . At round r > 9, the permutation used is σ rmod10 (for example, in the last round r = 13, the permutation σ 13mod10 = σ 3 is used). with the initial chaining value h = h 0 , . . . , h 7 and the salt s = s 0 , . . . , s 3 as follows:
The boomerang attack was introduced by D. Wagner in 1999 [26] as a tool for the cryptanalysis of block cipher. It is an adaptive chosen plaintext and ciphertext attack utilizing differential cryptanalysis. The cipher is treated as a cascade of two sub-ciphers, where a short differential is used in each of these sub-ciphers. These differentials are combined to exploit an adaptive chosen plaintext and ciphertext property of the cipher that has high probability. Then J. Kelsey et al. [27] further developed it into a chosen plaintext attack called the amplified boomerang attack, and later it was developed by E.
Biham et al. [28] into the rectangle attack. Then E. Biham et al. [29] combined the boomerang (and the rectangle) attack with related-key differentials and proposed the related-key boomerang and rectangle attacks, which use the related-key differentials instead of the single-key differentials.
We mainly review the known-related-key boomerang attack [6] which can be used to distinguish a given permutation from a random oracle. Applying the known-related-key boomerang attack to the compression function in the MMO mode,
i.e, CF (M, K) = E(M, K)+M that can be decomposed into two sub-functions with CF = CF 1 •CF 0 , we usually start from the middle steps (refer to [6, 11] ) as we can use message modification technique [2] to significantly improve the complexity of attack. This is the main reason why we can penetrate so many more rounds, and it also makes the boomerangs on cipher and on hash function different. We have a backward differential characteristic (β, β k ) → α with probability p for CF −1 0 , and another forward differential characteristic (γ, γ k ) → δ with probability q for CF 1 . Then the known-related-key boomerang attack can be constructed using these two differentials as follows:
-Randomly choose values for the message X 1 and the key K 1 , compute X 2 = X 1 ⊕ β, X 3 = X 1 ⊕ γ, X 4 = X 3 ⊕ β, and
to obtain P i (i = 1, 2, 3, 4).
-Compute forward from (X i , K i ) using CF 1 to obtain C i (i = 1, 2, 3, 4).
-Check whether
We can deduce that P 1 ⊕ P 2 = P 3 ⊕ P 4 = α and C 1 ⊕ C 3 = C 2 ⊕ C 4 = δ hold with probability at least p 2 in the backward direction and q 2 in the forward direction. Hence, the attack succeeds with probability p 2 q 2 when assuming that the differentials are independent.
For an n-bit random function, there exist three types of boomerang distinguishers according to the input and output differences (refer to [6, 11, 12] ).
-Type I: A quartet satisfies P 2 ⊕ P 1 = P 4 ⊕ P 3 = α and C 3 ⊕ C 1 = C 4 ⊕ C 2 = δ for fixed differences α and δ. In this case, the generic complexity is 2 n .
-Type II: Only C 3 ⊕ C 1 = C 4 ⊕ C 2 is satisfied (This property is also called zero-sum or second-order differential collision).
In this case, the complexity for obtaining such a quartet is 2 n/3 by using D. Wagner's generalized birthday attack [30] .
-Type III: A quartet satisfies P 2 ⊕ P 1 = P 4 ⊕ P 3 and
In this case, the best known attack still takes time 2 n/2 .
The Boomerang Attacks on SM3
In this section, we present the boomerang attacks on the SM3 compression function reduced to 34 and 35 steps with practical examples of boomerang quartets, and then extend the attacks to 36 and 37 steps. Firstly, we have to find the differential characteristics used in the attack to distinguish the target compression function from random functions. Secondly, we derive the sufficient conditions in the middle steps, and fulfill these conditions by using message modification technique. Finally, we evaluate the complexities of our attacks and search for examples of right quartets.
Step-Reduced Differential Characteristics
We give two differential characteristics which are used to attack 34-step SM3 compression function and build boomerang distinguisher, where the top differential characteristic is from step 15 to step 0, and the bottom one is from step 16 to step 33. Note that we will use the XOR difference ∆a = a ⊕ a . Let ∆a: i for 1 ≤ i ≤ 32 denote that the i-th bit of a is different from the i-th bit of a , and all the other bits of a and a are the same.
We start from the middle states of the distinguisher quartet (V 1 , V 2 , V 3 , V 4 ), and for the top characteristic, the differences of the message words w i and the chaining variables A 16 to H 16 are chosen as follows:
, if we choose the message words with such differences, we will find that 13 steps (step 13 to 1) are passed with probability 1. This is significant for us to get the high probability differential characteristic. For the bottom characteristic, we select the differences as follows:
-∆w 20 : 20 (the 20-th bit difference), ∆w i = 0 (21 ≤ i ≤ 35), so we can pass 11 steps (step 21 to 31) for free similarly. to the differences of the message words above, also considering the compatibility with the top characteristic in the middle steps which cannot contain any contradiction, the differences of chaining variables in bottom characteristic are derived with some sufficient conditions. For example, to cancel the 9-th and 10-th bit differences of w 17 , we choose the difference in D 17 only on bit 9 but not on bits 9 and 10, because if we have a difference in D 17 on bit 10, then in step 16 the condition A 16,10 = B 16,10 (note that C 16 = D 17 ) cannot be satisfied in the other side (V 2 , V 4 ).
In Table 3 and Table 4 the differential characteristics for both forward and backward directions are shown. Furthermore, the conditions and probabilities for each step of the differential characteristics are given.
Message Modification for the Middle Steps
Here we use the message modification technique to modify the chaining values and message words to satisfy the conditions of the middle steps to improve the complexity of our attack.
In the top differential characteristic, there are 16 sufficient conditions from step 15 to step 14, which can be satisfied both in two sides (V 1 , V 2 ) and (V 
Complexity of the Attack
After message modification, the boomerang distinguisher in the middle steps (14 to 20) holds with a much higher probability 2 −14 . Meanwhile, the probability of steps 13 to 0 in top characteristic is 2 −2 , and for steps 21 to 33 in bottom characteristic is 2 −(3+14) = 2 −17 . Since all conditions need to be fulfilled in both two sides, the boomerang distinguisher holds with probability 2 −2×2 = 2 −4 in steps 13 to 0 and 2 −2×17 = 2 −34 in steps 21 to 33. So the complexity of the 34-step boomerang distinguisher is 2
If we only obtain a zero-sum distinguisher, i.e. P 1 ⊕P 2 = P 3 ⊕P 4 and C 1 ⊕C 3 = C 2 ⊕C 4 , for each non-zero difference bit in ∆P (∆C), there is a probability about 1/3 that the carry extension in (P 1 , P 2 )((C 1 , C 3 )) is the same as in (P 3 , P 4 )((C 2 , C 4 )) [11, 12] . Let n denote the number of non-zero difference bits in ∆P (∆C), the probability is deduced as follows: assume that n = 1, then averagely there is 1 condition, and the probability is 2 −1 for one side and 2 −2×1 = 2 −2 for both two sides; assume that n = 2, then averagely there are 2 conditions, and the probability is 2 −2 for one side and 2 −2×2 = 2 −4 for both two sides. The same procedure can be easily adapted to more possible values of n: n = 3, the probability is 2 −3 for one side and 2 −6 for both two sides; n = 4, 2 −4 for one side and 2 −8 for both two sides; . . . . If we only consider P 1 ⊕ P 2 = P 3 ⊕ P 4
(C 1 ⊕C 3 = C 2 ⊕C 4 ), the probability is the sum of all above probabilities: 2
Hence, the boomerang distinguisher holds with probability 3 −2 in step 0 and 3 −14 in step 33. Meanwhile, the boomerang distinguisher holds with probability 2 −14 in steps 14 to 20 after message modification, with probability 1 in steps 13 to 1, and 2 −2×3 = 2 −6 in steps 21 to 32. As a result, the complexity can be reduced to 2 14 + 2
Due to the low complexity, our distinguisher on up to 34-step compression function of SM3 is practical, and we are able to find boomerang quartets on a PC quickly. We give an example of 34-step boomerang distinguisher in Table 5 . Table 3 , we add one more step as the new 16-th step in the bottom differential characteristic as illustrated in Table 6 to mount a 35-step attack. So the step where the single bit difference has been set in the message word w i in the bottom differential characteristic should slip to step 21. Now we look at the choice of differences in bottom differential characteristic, if we still use the same bit , and the practical example of 35-step boomerang distinguisher quartet can be found on a PC, see Table 7 .
36-Step Attack (Steps 0-35).
The 36-step attack is obtained with the same differential characteristics as 35-step attack by adding one step in the top differential characteristic as the new first step (see Table 8 ), where the top differential characteristic is from step 16 to step 0 and the bottom one is from step 17 to step 35. In order to keep the probability of connection part between the top and bottom differential characteristics unchanged, we change the differences of the top differential characteristic slightly: 
37-
Step Attack (Steps 0-36). Extending the 36-step boomerang distinguisher for one step at the end of the bottom differential characteristic (see Table 9 ), we get a 37-step boomerang attack on SM3 with a complexity of 2 32 +2
Note that the boomerang distinguishers on higher number of steps are obtained by extending more steps after the boomerangs on lower number of steps, which in turn have been proven to be correct by providing examples of quartets.
Thus these theoretical attacks on the high step boomerangs are also correct and do not have any incompatibilities.
Remark: For the 34/35/36-step attacks on SM3, we use the Type III boomerang distinguisher (see Sect. 3), and the complexity for the best algorithm is 2 128 ; for the 37-step attack on SM3, we use the Type I boomerang distinguisher, and the generic complexity is about 2 256 .
The Incompatibility of Previous Boomerang Attacks on SM3
In [17] , boomerang distinguisher for SM3 compression function reduced to 33 steps and the corresponding example of zero-sum quartet were given. However, we find that the proposed example of quartet is not consistent with the differential characteristics shown in that paper. According to the differences of the given example, it is supposed to be generated by adding one step after their 32-step distinguisher. Then we study the given 33-step boomerang distinguisher in [17] and find some contradictions between the two differential characteristics. Hence, the 33-step boomerang distinguisher in [17] cannot work in fact. Since their 34-step and 35-step distinguishers are constructed by adding one and two steps after the 33-step distinguisher, those two attacks cannot work either. We can correct the bottom differential characteristic by simply changing the single bit difference of message word w 20 from bit 28 to 20.
The Boomerang Attacks on BLAKE-256
Similar to above, there are also incompatible problems in previous boomerang attacks on BLAKE-256 [4] , and the detailed contradictions are shown in [24] . In this section, we give two alternative differential characteristics, and the first valid 7-round and 8-round boomerang attacks on keyed permutation of BLAKE-256 are mounted. Note that the keyed permutation of BLAKE-256 can be seen as the internal cipher of BLAKE-256, which excludes the Initialization and Finalization procedures. -Then set the differences of chaining variables which are basically decided by the differences of message words. Table 10 gives the top and bottom differential characteristics used for 7-round boomerang attack on BLAKE-256.
Similar to the attacks on SM3, message modification technique is used to fulfill the conditions of middle rounds to improve our attack. By modifying chaining variables v i (i=0, . . . , 15) of round 6.5 and message words m i (i=0, . . . , 15), 29 conditions in G 0 ∼ G 3 of round 6, 40 conditions in G 4 ∼ G 7 of round 6, 2 conditions in round 5 and 2 conditions in round 7 can be satisfied in both two sides. After message modification, the conditions of this part (rounds 4 to 7) can hold with probability at least 2 −2×(1+4) = 2 −10 . As a result, the boomerang distinguisher on 7 rounds keyed permutation of BLAKE-256 has the complexity 2 10 × 3 16+1 ≈ 2 10 × 2 27 = 2 37 . Due to the practical complexity, we can obtain the boomerang quartet which is one more round than the previous best result [4] . See Table 11 .
8-Round Boomerang Attack on Keyed Permutation of BLAKE-256. As shown in Table 10 , we just extend the differential characteristics used in 7-round attack for additional half round both in forward and backward directions, and obtain a 8-round boomerang distinguisher for keyed permutation of BLAKE-256 with complexity 2 2×(54+16+1+4+1+24) = 2 200 .
Remark: Similar to attacks on SM3, we use the Type III boomerang distinguisher for the 7-round attack on BLAKE-256, and Type I boomerang distinguisher for the 8-round attack on BLAKE-256.
Conclusion
This paper presents boomerang attacks on Chinese cryptographic hash function standard SM3 and the NIST SHA-3 finalist BLAKE-256. We propose boomerang distinguishers for the compression function of SM3 reduced to 34/35/36/37 steps out of 64 steps, and give examples of boomerang distinguishers on up to 34-step and 35-step SM3. Besides, we point out and
correct the incompatible problems existed in the previous attacks on SM3. Then we present boomerang distinguishers on 7 and 8 round-reduced keyed permutation of BLAKE-256 out of 14 rounds, which are the first valid boomerang results on 7-round and 8-round keyed permutation of BLAKE-256. Also, we give a boomerang quartet of the distinguisher on 7-round keyed permutation of BLAKE-256 for the first time. All these results are the best as far as we know. Table 3 . Differential characteristic for steps 0-15 used in the boomerang attack on 34-step CF of SM3 i chaining variables message conditions prob 0 B 0 : 23 Table 5 . Example of a boomerang quartet for 34-step CF of SM3. P i , C i and M i respectively denote the chaining variables of step 0, 33 and message words. P 1 8e328bf 1 540ba9e5 026995ca d1271808 8af c4d19 95bddaa7 a56d9207 a2c44d1c P 2 8e328bf 1 544ba9e5 826995ca 51671808 8af c4d19 95bdcaa7 256d9207 22c43d1c P 3 11ee1c76 ee57de46 54838689 0665bf 71 df 61a977 5f 4c46e9 d42981b4 c15ec4f 8 P 4 11ee1c76 ee17de46 d4838689 8625bf 71 df 61a977 5f 4c56e9 542981b4 415eb4f 8 M 1 d7a6bd34 66f a6ef a 78ce08a1 9a585055 94c8bc0b 3b679ebd 3910da41 f 0e82d8a d5f 41b80 64f 0041d 947bccb4 4344d2ed bcc94a67 6b5f 97f f 79000306 16233872 M 2 d7a6bd34 66f a6ef a f 8ce08a1 9a585055 94c8bc0b 3b679ebd 3910da41 f 0e82d8a d5f 41b80 64f 0041d 947bccb4 4344d2ed bcc94a67 6b5f 97f f 79000306 16233872 M 3 d7acbd36 26f baef a 50ce00a1 1f dad3d5 94c2b90e 333f b685 3918da41 70e8ad8c d5f 49b80 64f 0041d 9570c9b3 c3c4d3ed bcc94a67 6b5797f f f 9008304 16233872 M 4 d7acbd36 26f baef a d0ce00a1 1f dad3d5 94c2b90e 333f b685 3918da41 70e8ad8c d5f 49b80 64f 0041d 9570c9b3 c3c4d3ed bcc94a67 6b5797f f f 9008304 16233872 C 1 5cc18f 78 adf 682b8 837bc39c 1550ef 7d 5e6d092c b95a7f 10 0f dde16d 3dc6bf 65 C 2 35437883 a37697ca 94f a71b5 169e842d 07d1f 375 e5e58686 e97b5e86 72b07d54 C 3 bcd1cf bd adee86bc 837bc39c 1550ef 7d f ecc48ec b95a7f 10 0f dde16d 3dc6bf 65 C 4 d5533846 a36e93ce 94f a71b5 169e842d a770b2b5 e5e58686 e97b5e86 72b07d54 Table 7 . Example of a boomerang quartet for 35-step CF of SM3 P 1 7f 57e38d 801906df caf 2cf 8c 42c58f ba 9f eec59b ef 5ab3f c d261869c 892ca15c P 2 7f 57e38d 805906df 4af 2cf 8c c2858f ba 9f eec59b ef 5aa3f c 5261869c 092cb15c P 3 0188f 80d 5d3b7666 9f 941688 f c411326 3a674355 2c6075f b 85a38600 892e081b P 4 0188f 80d 5d7b7666 1f 941688 7c011326 3a674355 2c6065f b 05a38600 092e181b M 1 f 5bc88b9 af 543ad9 f 5068596 beaebbf 0 9984c067 ed6e551a 7973166d cef 6b36f c6978096 f dba14b7 2872f f ba 2cf 314e6 750499b3 4ceb9f 22 bd2d99db 71cc928b M 2 f 5bc88b9 af 543ad9 75068596 beaebbf 0 9984c067 ed6e551a 7973166d cef 6b36f c6978096 f dba14b7 2872f f ba 2cf 314e6 750499b3 4ceb9f 22 bd2d99db 71cc928b M 3 75bc89b9 af f 43af 9 f 51a8592 3eae3bf 2 c1acf 86f edce054a f cf 195ed ce76b36f c69f 80f e f db214b7 2872f f ba 3c434496 7d0489bb 4ceb9f 22 bdad99db 71c492a3 M 4 75bc89b9 af f 43af 9 751a8592 3eae3bf 2 c1acf 86f edce054a f cf 195ed ce76b36f c69f 80f e f db214b7 2872f f ba 3c434496 7d0489bb 4ceb9f 22 bdad99db 71c492a3 C 1 ecda4c19 39e58f b5 8f bc81e3 75eec099 655e3f 8b f 4273d52 94532c77 6967f 472 C 2 93f f b93f e7e2f f b3 447c0e9f b8f f 8f 6c 37a12b0a ca38d92c 7eb36c56 899e0baf C 3 f 2de485f 3965cf f 5 8f bc81e3 75eec099 6f 523b8d f 4273d52 94532c77 6967f 472 C 4 8df bbd79 e762bf f 3 447c0e9f b8f f 8f 6c 3dad2f 0c ca38d92c 7eb36c56 899e0baf Table 11 . Example of a boomerang quartet for 7-round KP of BLAKE-256 P 1 3c8a4276 cf b0dcc0 ab6c46f c da21a046 ec13b53b cf 12cee3 45f c2729 ccca4dee 14c76a6a 40f 2aada a0933ddf d51f 0f 3e 260c01f 7 6beb49c8 da575eb9 a72108d8 P 2 3c9a4286 cf b0dcc0 ab6c46f c da21a045 ec03b52b cf 12cee3 45f c2729 ccda4def 04b75a7a 40f 2aada a0933ddf d50f 0f 3e 360c11f 7 6beb49c8 da575eb9 a71108d8 P 3 ac3b9572 70a2660d 6520d49f d01074b9 71422e9e 39e0c7ab 4af 9b4d4 797282e3 86cddb58 b5c62820 5b8f f 4d0 be138673 8b1e21ea b6dd991a 36176157 ebc193f 1 P 4 ac2b9582 70a2660d 6520d49f d01074ba 71522e8e 39e0c7ab 4af 9b4d4 796282e2 96bdeb48 b5c62820 5b8f f 4d0 be038673 9b1e31ea b6dd991a 36176157 ebf 193f 1 M 1 cf 25b88d 0b85815c 7a2c591a 6df 41a94 59eb3709 ef 111a43 c3f 441c7 846d24e6 950acec4 df aa5876 05676c74 a3a2894f a000f f 75 31595bf 2 61592468 79f 50b81 M 2 cf 25b88d 0b85815c 7a2c591a 6df 41a94 59eb3709 ef 011a43 c3f 441c7 846d24e6 950acec4 df aa5876 05676c74 a3a2894f a000f f 75 31595bf 2 61592468 79f 50b81 M 3 cf 25b88d 0b85815c 7a2c591a 6df 41a94 59eb3709 ef 111a43 c3f 441c7 846d24e6 950acec4 df aa5876 05676c74 23a2894f a000f f 75 31595bf 2 61592468 79f 50b81 M 4 cf 25b88d 0b85815c 7a2c591a 6df 41a94 59eb3709 ef 011a43 c3f 441c7 846d24e6 950acec4 df aa5876 05676c74 23a2894f a000f f 75 31595bf 2 61592468 79f 50b81 C 1 1db2186a ce3f e558 a96bdf 5e b0895b04 678b343b d6dd58ea e333eb5d f e982f 92 52660ebe f 519f abe d32be0de b81731bb 185dd895 050bf 35e bc6f 992c eb0364f 8 C 2 f bb8c27f 99cf f 7f 2 ab2dabef f aa5905e 709f 8d52 81f 4ec99 d3b15660 d6412448 ad141e81 bf 02aa21 f d84e3f b 02a3bc0d 973c04e0 bb95e80b 5f cad084 f 2f 36107 C 3 9db2186a ce3f e558 a96bdf 5e b0895b04 678b343b d6dc58ea e333eb5d f e982f 92 52660ebe f 519f abe d3abe0de b81731bb 185dd895 050bf 35e bc6f 992c eb8364f 8 C 4 7bb8c27f 99cf f 7f 2 ab2dabef f aa5905e 709f 8d52 81f 5ec99 d3b15660 d6412448 ad141e81 bf 02aa21 f d04e3f b 02a3bc0d 973c04e0 bb95e80b 5f cad084 f 2736107
